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Under the Direction of Andrew Jason Cohen 
 
ABSTRACT 
In this thesis I distinguish between two conceptions of naturalism that have been offered as 
possible starting points for a virtue based ethics.  The first version of naturalism is characterized by 
Philippa Foot’s project in Natural Goodness.  The second version of naturalism can be found, in various 
forms, among the works of John McDowell, Martha Nussbaum, and Rosalind Hursthouse.  I argue that 
neither naturalistic approach is entirely successful on its own, but that we can fruitfully carve a path 
between both approaches that points the way to a positive ethical account.  I then conclude with a brief 
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Chapter I: Introduction - Two Sorts of Naturalism, Revisited 
 
 
 John McDowell, in his paper entitled “Two Sorts of Naturalism,” distinguishes his version 
of a naturalized ethics from the version espoused by Philippa Foot. According to McDowell, Foot 
seeks to ground her ethics in a scientific realism that is wholly external to our own human 
perspective. In other words, Foot’s ethical position is grounded in extra-ethical scientific facts, 
facts that do not require our understanding or knowledge in order for them to be true. McDowell 
counters this form of naturalism with his own version, which takes for its ground the internal and 
evaluative ethical perspective of the practically wise agent, or phronemos. Naturalism, as it is 
commonly understood, aligns most closely with Foot’s project, and part of the task of this thesis 
will be to show how McDowell’s project can be productively understood as a form of naturalism. 
The more important consideration, however, is which of these projects offers the most promising 
starting point for a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics. It is the aim of this thesis to revisit the 
distinction that McDowell has introduced in order to investigate the promise found in both 
versions of naturalism as well as their respective limitations. For the most part my argument will 
be negative, pointing out what each respective theory cannot do. Ultimately, though, I see great 
promise for a naturalized virtue ethics and it is the goal of this thesis to point to what such a 
naturalized ethics must look like.  
 I begin my thesis with an account of Foot’s version of a naturalized ethics. This account 
will follow closely the text of her most fully developed position as it is laid out in Natural 
Goodness. Part of my argument in this chapter hinges on what I take to be an unclear picture of 
nature and what sort of access we have to it in Foot’s argument. I believe Foot’s naturalism relies 
on a metaphysical realism in the form of natural kinds. If this is the case then her position can be 
criticized from two sides. First, a robust metaphysics is serving as an assumed premise in the rest 
2 
of her argument. While this is not a reason to reject her position outright, it does give us reason 
to expect an argument for such a metaphysics, an argument that she does not provide. This leaves 
her position incomplete, possibly irredeemably. Second, even if we allow the metaphysical 
premise, it is not clear that natural kinds can be used in the same way, or are as normatively 
illuminating, when the discussion shifts from plants and animals to humans. 
 While I take the above criticisms to be compelling reasons to call into question a large 
portion of Foot’s argument, I believe there is still a great deal of promise in her project. Her book 
can still be useful in understanding how a theory of normative agency can be given if we have 
the sort of access to natural facts that Foot believes we do. In short, even if we reject Foot’s 
stable, scientific version of natural human life, her account of rational agency still gives us a 
promising framework in which to understand moral actions otherwise grounded. 
 One may ask what other form of moral ground is open to us from which we could find 
Foot’s depiction of moral agency useful? The answer, I suggest, following McDowell, is a form 
of moral realism that develops out of our already-acquired ethical perspective1 when it undergoes 
a Neurathian-style evaluation. A description of such a process forms the third chapter of this 
thesis. In this chapter I will argue that McDowell and Martha Nussbaum give us an illuminating 
description of how we pre-theoretically undergo the process of moral development. However, 
both McDowell and Nussbaum want to claim that from this description of moral development, 
coupled with ethical reflection that takes place within the ethical framework itself,2 a form of 
moral realism can be offered. I will argue that McDowell and Nussbaum have weakened ethical 
stability to an extent beyond which any reasonable conception of moral realism can be applied.  
 I do not see this as a fatal flaw in their argument, though—a point I will take up in the 
                                                             
1 This is an ethical perspective with which we are always already engaged.  McDowell takes the stance that our pre-
reflective ethical beliefs cannot simply be discounted in favor of some purely theoretical stance. 
2 What McDowell likens to Neurathian Reflection. 
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fourth chapter. I look to Rosalind Hursthouse as a philosopher who has recognized the 
limitations on both sides of the naturalism debate and has tried to find a way between them. 
Ultimately, I will argue, she falls into a similar trap as McDowell and Nussbaum; however, the 
attempt she makes points in the correct direction. In the concluding chapter I take these 
limitations and Hursthouse’s suggestion to get past them and try to carve out a possible positive 
account of the virtues from a qualified naturalist position. I offer only a sketch to be further 


















Chapter II: Towards a Natural Foundation for Normativity 
1. Introduction  
 Philippa Foot has written recently about how natural facts concerning what it is to be a 
human can play a foundational role for our understanding of the virtues. In Natural Goodness, 
Foot attempts to ground our moral statements on natural facts about our species. In the same way 
that an oak tree is good only insofar as it has the traits that allow it to flourish qua oak tree, a 
human is good insofar as she has the traits that allow her to flourish qua human. Shifting the 
conversation away from what she takes to be non-natural, metaphysical conceptions of good and 
bad and placing the emphasis on evaluative conceptions of good and bad as they pertain to 
natural facts, Foot believes she can account for human virtues and vices in a way that avoids the 
challenges presented by non-cognitivists specifically and moral skeptics generally. In this 
chapter, I will argue that Foot’s depiction of a natural normativity provides us with helpful 
guidance in our moral conversation, particularly in that it provides a framework for moral 
evaluation that is firmly rooted in experience. Ultimately, however, I will argue that Foot 
inadvertently slips back into an assumed metaphysical position, replacing metaphysical 
conceptions of good and bad with a reliance on a metaphysical realism in regard to natural kinds.  
 
2. Foot’s Natural Normativity 
 Foot is looking for what she calls a “fresh start” for moral philosophy. She hopes to 
extricate moral philosophy from what she believes is a wrong-headed approach taken by 
subjectivists, prescriptivists, and expressivists, all of whom she places under the banner of non-
cognitivism.3 Foot acknowledges the difficulty non-cognitivists are trying to tackle, which she 
                                                             
3 Placing all these theories under the category of non-cognitivism is problematic.  Subjectivism, the position that 
most closely aligns with Foot’s subsequent description, allows that moral statements can be true or false for the 
5 
describes as the Humean requirement for our moral philosophy to be practical, or action 
guiding.4 However, she believes that non-cognitivists went at the problem from the wrong “side.” 
She writes:  
What all these theories tried to do, then, was to give the conditions of use of sentences 
such as ‘It is morally objectionable to break promises’ in terms of something that must be 
true about the speaker. He must have certain feelings or attitudes... Meaning was thus to 
be explained in terms of a speaker’s attitude, intentions, or state of mind.5 
 
In short, if someone makes a claim that uses moral language, what they are actually saying is that 
they have some reason to act in that particular way. Foot begins by pointing out a problem with 
such a theory. She argues that a gap opens up between moral judgments and assertions. An 
assertion can be true so long as it corresponds to some fact out there in the world. But moral 
judgments, on the non-cognitivist view, have reference only to subjective states. They are true 
only insofar as they correspond to the mental state in the subject. Such a view may be able to 
describe the action-guiding nature of claims such as “It is morally objectionable to break 
promises” but it fails to capture the truth of the statement. The truth of such a statement, Foot 
believes, is to be found external to the will of the subject and in the world in which the action in 
question is to take place. Foot concludes: “It is the mistake of so construing what is ‘special’ 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
subject who makes them.  Non-cognitivism holds that moral ‘statements’ are not statements, strictly speaking, at all, 
because they are not truth functional.  As such, prescriptivism and emotivism fall under the heading of non-
cognitivism while subjectivism remains importantly distinct.  However, this important distinction is not 
acknowledged by Foot, who writes: “This is the subjectivism—often called ‘non-cognitivism’—that came to the 
fore with A.J. Ayer, C.L. Stevenson, and Richard Hare, informed the work of John Mackie and many others, and has 
lately appeared, refreshed, in Allan Gibbards ‘expressivist’ account of normative language.” (Foot, Natural 
Goodness, 8).  For the purposes of this thesis (and, arguably, for Foot’s project as she has in her argumentative 
sights both subjectivism and non-cognitivism) this oversight is not problematic.  However, I think it is important to 
flag.   
4 Hume writes: “‘Tis one thing to know virtue, and another to conform the will to it. In order, therefore, to prove, 
that the measures of right and wrong are eternal laws, obligatory on every rational mind, ‘tis not sufficient to show 
the relations upon which they are founded: We must also point out the connexion betwixt the relation and the will; 
and must prove that this connexion is so necessary, that in every well-dispos’d mind, it must take place and have its 
influence; tho’ the difference betwixt these minds be in other respects immense and infinite” (Hume, A Treatise of 
Human Nature 3.1.1.22). Of course Hume concludes that no move directly from the rational to the willed can take 
place. 
5 Foot, Natural Goodness, 8. 
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about moral judgement [sic] that the grounds of a moral judgement do not reach all the way to 
it.”6 Someone may coherently reject the moral judgment of another simply because they do not 
share the requisite feeling or attitude. In Foot’s words they lack the “‘conative’ state of mind” 
that is required for moral agreement as well as to explain the action guiding nature of the moral 
judgments necessary if we are to account for moral failures.   
 Foot denies that such a gap between moral judgment (here beliefs about what is right and 
wrong) and assertion (here statements that connect with facts about what is the case) exists. She 
believes that “Hume’s demand [that moral claims be action guiding] is met by the (most un-
Humean) thought that acting morally is part of practical rationality.”7 If our practical rationality 
is to be action guiding, it must have some criterion by which it guides our actions rationally. This 
criterion, Foot maintains, is wholly natural. She believes that moral statements such as “It is 
wrong to break promises” and prudential statements such as “One should not live a sedentary 
lifestyle” have the same rational basis in human flourishing. Failure to recognize the rational 
basis that grounds either statement will result in one’s failure to flourish as a member of the 
human species. It is on this point that moral judgments are supposed to connect with facts about 
the world.  Much of this discussion relies on Foot’s use of G.E.M. Anscombe’s description of 
“Aristotelian necessities”. An “Aristotelian necessity”8 is something that is necessary for a 
particular thing, insofar as it belongs to a type, in order for it to be a successful member of the 
type in question. For this reason ‘good’ attaches to these necessities. 9 For a bee to be a 
successful bee it must be part of a colony. It is then good for a bee to be part of a colony, and for 
its behavior to conform to its role in the colony. Foot believes that this can be extended to the 
                                                             
6 Foot, Natural Goodness, 8 
7 Foot, Natural Goodness, 9.  
8 These are sometimes called “Aristotelian categoricals.”  I will use these terms interchangeably throughout the 
thesis. 
9 See Foot, Natural Goodness, 46; Anscombe, “On Promising and its Justice,” 18. 
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discussion of what we are as humans and what Aristotelian necessities we may, therefore, have. 
She points to such things as memory and concentration, which allow us to learn a language. She 
also points to our social nature and our dependence upon one another. This dependence leads to 
an other-regarding attitude that is necessary for our own success. If I know I depend on other 
people to flourish, then it would be irrational not to act in certain ways that take others into 
consideration, for instance by telling the truth and keeping promises. Here we can see how 
Aristotelian necessities link with what is good qua human in the very natural sense that they 
promote human flourishing.  Dispositions to tell the truth and keep promises, insofar as they 
promote a human life that is choice-worthy, map onto what we refer to as virtues, while 
dispositions that tend to hinder flourishing map onto what we refer to as vices.10 A human being 
should cultivate those dispositions that promote a flourishing human life if she is to act in 
accordance with practical reason. 
 Again, much of Foot’s discussion here can be understood in light of historical differences 
in our usage of so-called moral terms such as ‘should’ and ‘ought’ pointed out by Anscombe in 
her paper, “Modern Moral Philosophy.” In this paper Anscombe argues that ‘should’ and ‘ought’ 
lack any special moral sense in Aristotle’s ethics. Instead, they are better understood as 
indicating what is good or bad in a prudential sense. It is bad for machinery to run without oil, so 
we ought to keep our machinery oiled. There are certain behavioral or intellectual dispositions in 
humans that are bad for their development or flourishing, so we ought not develop such 
dispositions.11 In modern moral philosophy, however, this understanding of terms such as 
‘should’ and ‘ought’ has taken on a new, law-like conception so that when it is said that someone 
                                                             
10 Foot, Natural Goodness, 15-16. 
11 Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” 30. 
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ought to perform some act, a sense of obligation is implied.12 It is this sense of ‘ought’ that 
allows the much-discussed gap between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ to open up.  
 As Hume rightly points out,13 there is no necessary connection between what is the case 
and what “ought to be”—what we are under obligation to do. One is not obligated either to 
maintain or change what is the case; what is the case says nothing, or nothing necessary, about 
what ought to be the case.14   What motivates human action is whether or not we want something 
to be the case. However, if we keep to the Aristotelian sense of ought, as Anscombe and Foot 
suggest, we can still speak of what ought to be the case in regard to what is necessary for 
successful operation or flourishing without making the illegitimate move Hume warns against. 
Here we can say: “If one wants the machinery to keep running then one ought to put oil in it.” 
This statement is action guiding only if the agent wants to keep the machinery running, but it is 
true insofar as it is the case that oil is necessary for the machinery to keep running. The judgment 
now is of one’s practical reason given one’s desire to flourish. 
 
3. Foot’s Teleological Move 
 Naturalism in teleological ethics, then, is supposed to indicate what is necessary in order 
for a human to flourish. But what is it for a human to flourish? In order to get some indication of 
how Foot answers this question we first need to look at her conception of natural teleology in 
general. There are two ways in which we can speak of an oak tree being good. We can discuss 
                                                             
12 Anscombe tracks this shift in meaning through our religious history and its incorporation of ethical notions in 
divine law. 
13 I recognize that to assert Hume is correct in this matter is a contentious presupposition on my part. I feel I am 
justified in making this presupposition on the basis that if we reject Hume’s dilemma, claiming we can move readily 
from an “is” to an “ought,” then the majority of the issues this thesis is dealing with, as well as the issues the authors 
with which this thesis is concerned are dealing with, become non-problems.  By working from within this 
presupposition I hope to provide a meaningful discussion of neo-Aristotelian ethics regardless of the position one 
holds in regards to Hume’s dilemma.  The best way to do this is to argue from this, more difficult, perspective 
14 Hume, Treatise on Human Nature, 3.1.1.27 
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what a good oak tree is as it relates to human projects. A good oak tree to someone who runs a 
sawmill is one that is straight and thick such that it provides a valuable source of lumber. Or, if 
the human is an artist, a good oak tree may be dead and interestingly gnarled such that it 
provides an aesthetically pleasing subject matter for a canvas. In each of these cases, one 
answers what is good in an oak tree, or what ought to be the case in an oak tree, with a qua X 
statement where X is some project other than the oak tree’s flourishing. To put it in terms used 
above one may state: “If one wants to produce lumber, then the oak tree ought to be thick and 
straight.” But what is it to be a good oak tree qua oak tree? This is not a fundamentally different 
question, but it requires us to shift our perspective from that of human projects to that of the life 
of an oak tree. What sort of life is a good life for an oak tree? A life of successful survival and 
reproduction form the most direct answer to this question and as such can be seen as the telos of 
oak trees. A good oak tree is one that has the characteristics that enable it to survive and produce 
more oak trees. We can meaningfully speak of the function or purpose of particular tree activities 
in light of such a telos. As such, for an oak tree to have roots that are strong and spread out in 
such a way that they effectively pull nutrients and water from the ground, and to have leaves that 
are green and broad so as effectively to pull in energy from the sun, is to have the characteristics 
that make for a good oak tree qua oak tree. It is, therefore, from something’s telos that evaluative 
accounts concerning characteristics or attributes can be given.15 It is important to note here that 
an aspect of Foot’s theory is that the species in question directly informs the way the telos can 
meaningfully be fulfilled. An oak tree that failed to produce acorns but successfully reproduced 
in some other fashion could not be said to be fulfilling its telos as an oak tree. 
 Teleological explanations of this sort are easily given for something as simple as an oak 
tree. However, these sort of explanations get more difficult as the species under discussion 
                                                             
15 Foot, Natural Goodness, 46-47. 
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becomes more complex, a fact that Foot only indirectly touches upon. Bees, for example, have 
different roles to play in regard to the success of the hive and so different characteristics are good 
depending on what that role is. Here, for instance, we may be able to give a general description 
of a good bee as one that acts in such a way that it benefits the hive in regard to survival and the 
production of more bees. Particular characteristics such as being a good gatherer of pollen and 
being effective at communicating to other gatherers where the pollen can be found would be 
characteristics by which we would evaluate whether a worker was a good worker bee. However, 
if we were to evaluate a drone none of these characteristics would describe what it is to be a 
good drone. From these distinctions we can see that we can give natural descriptions of 
normative characteristics with varying degrees of specificity determined by the complexity of 
species in question. Normative descriptions of bees in general requires a degree of generality to 
be built in. If we move to the particular, and question whether an individual bee is a good bee, 
this generality does not really get at the question. We need to take into account the complexity 
found in the species of bee, identify the bee in question in its relation to this complexity, and 
evaluate the bee in accordance with this more specific list of natural characteristics it ought to 
have.16 Ultimately though, a set of characteristics is the set the bee ought to have because those 
are the characteristics peculiar to that type of bee insofar as they promote the success of the hive 
in general.17 Despite the fact that the description of what characteristics a particular bee ought to 
                                                             
16 In actuality the complexity that would be necessary to describe accurately what characteristics are good 
characteristics for particular types of bees to have, be they drones, workers, or queens, would also have to take into 
account the different jobs each type has at particular stages of development. Workers in particular have certain jobs 
that change as they mature. This fact goes some distance toward showing how natural descriptions of normative 
characteristics in particular members of a species can get extremely complicated very quickly. 
17 My point here is not that as we move to greater generality the goodness somehow detaches from the individual 
and is to be found instead in the hive.  Rather, my point is that the characteristics of a particular bee that make it a 
good bee are only explicable in terms of the role those characteristics play in the community of bees that make up 
the hive.  Foot makes much of Peter Geach’s claim that “Men need virtues as bees need stings” (see Foot, Natural 
Goodness, 35).  Bees only need stings if their life is to be understood, in terms of going well or badly, in a way that 
takes the success of the colony or hive as a relevant factor in this life. 
11 
have can get extremely complicated, Foot believes we can still say that what grounds that ought 
is a teleological claim about the bee species and the function that characteristic plays in regard to 
such a species. 
 
4. The Metaphysical Presupposition of Foot’s Argument 
 Foot’s conception of teleology relies upon stable natural facts upon which she can base 
normative claims. However, one might reasonably think that placing nature into species and 
classes in terms of their characteristic ways of getting along might itself be a human project.18 If 
so, then giving an account of what it means for a particular member of a species to flourish is a 
human understanding. If Foot’s argument is to get off the ground she needs to cut off this 
possibility, claiming instead that there is a stable ordering of species external to both our own 
human conception of nature as well as particular instantiations of nature.  In other words, our 
conception of nature seeks to mirror the external fact of the matter regarding species by 
extrapolating from commonalities found in particulars.  But this fact of the matter of species is 
neither our conception nor the particulars from which our conception is derived.  Foot’s 
discussion of members of a species flourishing qua the species in question makes this reliance 
apparent. We cannot speak of a particular member of a species flourishing or failing to flourish 
qua the species in question and expect such a statement to have the sort of stability that Foot 
seems to think it has, if the conception of such a species does not exist external to our own 
project of describing nature in particular ways. 
 To give an example, tree squirrels live a predominately solitary life, they breed about twice 
a year and the female looks after the young. According to Foot, in order for a tree squirrel to be 
                                                             
18 This statement can be taken in one of two ways. Either there are no natural kinds or understanding the world as if 
there are natural kinds is a human idiosyncracy. The implications of both possibilities will be taken up below. 
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described as flourishing it must be living a life where these characteristics are realized. This is 
not simply a claim about what is required for tree squirrel flourishing, it is also a claim about 
what we even mean when we say something is a tree squirrel.  For this reason, if a male squirrel 
stayed with the female squirrel and they raised the young in tandem, we can make sense of 
saying the male squirrel is in some way defective and not flourishing qua tree squirrel (even if 
the male’s behavior promotes the survival of the baby squirrels). We can do so by referring to the 
characteristics that play a role in the fulfillment of the teleology of members of the tree squirrel 
species. But the only way that such evaluations work is if there is some concept, external to all 
particular instantiations (of tree squirrels) by which the particulars are to be judged. A male tree 
squirrel, behaving in a way that it actually promotes the well-being of its offspring, would seem 
(at least on an account that takes into consideration its own particular goal) to be flourishing.19 If 
one wants to say otherwise, the criteria by which one judges flourishing must be external to the 
apparent goal of the particular life about which a judgment is being made.  In other words, the 
tree squirrel is defective only when considered against our understanding of tree-squirrel 
teleology.  
 Someone may counter, and in fact Foot does, that all we need is a general enough account 
of what is necessary for a particular species to flourish.  She writes: “The history of a species is 
not, however, the subject with which Aristotelian categoricals deal.  Their truth is truth about a 
species at a given historical time, and it is only the relative stability of at least the most general 
features of the different species of living things that makes these propositions possible at all.” 20  
This general account would allow for aberrations in behavior so long as that behavior could still 
be seen as, in some way, fulfilling some, more general, Aristotelian categorical.  But such a 
                                                             
19 See Foot, Natural Goodness, 42.  This point will be taken up further in the next section. 
20 See Foot, Natural Goodness, 29. 
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solution weakens the teleological description of a species to such a degree that it leaves it 
without any explanatory power.  Foot wants to determine species by their life form, here 
understood as Aristotelian categoricals and the functional role those categoricals play.  
Continuing in Foot’s words: “[A]ll the truths about what this or that characteristic does, what its 
purpose or point is, and in suitable cases its function, must be related to this life cycle.  The way 
an individual should be is determined by what is needed for development, self-maintenance, and 
reproduction: in most species involving defense, and in some the rearing of their young.”21  If we 
characterize species in this way we seem to lose the explanatory power we think we have in 
species descriptions.  Any behavior or characteristic that I can in some way describe as 
contributing to a particular animal’s reproduction or survival qualifies as a species description.  
But this cannot be right as it allows for far too much variation.   
 So it seems we are left with a claim by which species descriptions include behavior and 
characteristics which are only arbitrary (in the sense that they could be otherwise and not effect 
the survival or reproduction of the particular animal, but that these characteristics still count as 
characteristics of the species in question).  Only by maintaining this claim can we maintain 
species parameters understood as common (but not universal) behaviors and characteristics of 
living things.  This claim, while by no means absurd, can only be supported from two possible 
positions. The first is that there is a form of “tree squirrel” out there in the world in some sense 
that the particular squirrel is imperfectly instantiating. If this is the case, then one would expect 
some argument from Foot for such a strong metaphysical position.22 I am not here making any 
                                                             
21 Foot, Natural Goodness, 32-33. 
22 This would also put Foot precariously close to a Platonic conception of forms, which would, I think, be absurd.  
But it seems clear to me that she is tied to a type of species realism, probably one that puts her closer to the second 
possibility I take up. 
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claims concerning the possibility of such an argument;23 I am merely pointing out that if this 
were her position, it would not be convincing until such an argument is given. The other option 
is that the concept ‘tree squirrel’ is an artifact of human science, and by the lights of this science 
this particular squirrel is acting deficiently. In this case it is not a tree squirrel24 teleology that is 
in question but rather a human concept. If this is the case then Foot’s teleological arguments 
speak more to what we are as humans than what nature is like in itself. I mention this objection 
here merely to show that, as it is, Foot’s natural teleology is incomplete.25 In the next chapter I 
will provide an argument for why I think any attempt to complete it will confront problems. I 
move now to a discussion of how Foot implements her teleological framework for human 
normativity. I think this argument runs into a separate problem, but I want to emphasize that 
ultimately I think Foot gets something right. Precisely what this is will become apparent through 
the course of the thesis.  
 
5. The Teleological Move as it Pertains to Humans 
 I briefly sketched above26 how naturalism is supposed to answer the non-cognitivist’s and 
moral skeptic’s challenge: Hume demanded that morality be action guiding. Non-cognitivists 
answer this challenge by arguing that when moral language is used by a speaker it expresses 
some attitudinal or intentional state of mind within the speaker, and it is this intentional state that 
explains the reason the individual has to act “morally.” But, as Foot argues, this is hardly 
satisfying to anyone who wants to say that morality provides reasons to act in a certain way, 
                                                             
23 McDowell does argue against the possibility of any such argument, which I will take up in the next chapter. 
24 One could argue that I am not even justified in using the term ‘tree squirrel’ to denote anything other than the 
scientific concept of tree squirrel as it grounds our linguistic use of ‘tree squirrel’. Such a view would only confirm 
my claim that when we talk about success and failure in species we are only doing so in regard to human 
understanding and never getting at nature itself. 
25 Or, possibly, looks a lot more like McDowell’s naturalism than either would want to admit. 
26 See Section II. 
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reasons that are communicable to others. A non-cognitivist may simply shrug her shoulders and 
say she is not moved by those reasons because she lacks the requisite intentional state. Foot 
introduces practical rationality within a teleological framework as the answer to the Humean 
challenge. It is not the attitudinal or intentional state that should be action guiding, it is practical 
rationality. Of course, in order for our rationality to guide us it needs certain criteria. Such 
criteria are found in Aristotelian necessities. An Aristotelian necessity is something that is 
necessary for a particular thing, insofar as it belongs to a type of thing, in order for it to be 
successful in what it is. This brought us to a discussion of ‘should’ and ‘ought’ and the peculiar 
shift in meaning these terms have undergone in modern moral philosophy in that they have 
acquired a sense of obligation. This sense was distinguished from the non-obligatory, project-
oriented sense that can be seen in sentences that take the form: “If one wants to φ then one ought 
to Ψ.” To Ψ is not obligatory, but if one does in fact want to φ then one has a practical, action 
guiding reason to Ψ. Foot’s natural teleology fills in φ with “flourish” as it pertains to each 
particular species in question. These Aristotelian necessities refer to the teleological project of 
flourishing as it is understood in the species in question, and the actions of any particular 
member of the species must be evaluated based on this species-centered teleological project. 
 Foot believes that this natural normativity framework can give us a meaningful, action-
guiding justification for why we should cultivate certain character traits (i.e., ‘virtues’) and reject 
others (i.e., ‘vices’). The question is whether such a teleological understanding of species can be 
made to fit human nature in the same way it does species in the non-rational botanical and 
zoological worlds.27 It is important to note that when filling in the sentence: “If one wants to φ 
then one ought to Ψ” in light of a particular non-rational individual in a species, we cannot 
                                                             
27 Bracketing my concern in the last section and allowing that Foot’s natural teleology does in fact work in these 
cases. 
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legitimately say that the individual recognizes a practical, action-guiding reason to Ψ. We can 
recognize that there is such a reason, but the individual can be judged by us as good or bad, 
successful or unsuccessful, only in terms of its successful (or unsuccessful) fulfillment of its 
telos. But when it comes to humans, we are capable of recognizing practical, action guiding 
reasons for Ψ-ing.  Furthermore, we are the species for whom projects are an open question. I 
can choose one project28 over another and have that project be part of what it means to be a 
flourishing human being. Foot writes:  
What conceptually determines goodness in a feature or operation is the relation, for the 
species, of that feature or operation to survival and reproduction, because it is in that that 
good lies in the botanical and zoological worlds. At that point questions of ‘How?’ and 
‘Why?’ and ‘What for?’ come to an end. But clearly this is not true when we come to 
human beings.29 
 
If an individual human cannot reproduce that may be seen as a defect;30 however, a human can 
choose not to reproduce and it not be a defect. The questions to ask at this point are, “What is it 
about humans that makes this possible?” and, “Does this possibility prevent us from applying the 
criteria of natural normativity, understood as teleological explanations for certain necessary 
features, to humans in the same way we have done to botanical and non-rational animals?”  
 Foot believes the difference between human and non-human animals (and plants) comes 
down to complexity. As such, no fundamental changes need to be made when applying the same 
natural teleological arguments to either non-rational animals or humans, so long as the 
complexity of a human life is taken into account. On my reading of Foot, in the same way that it 
is more difficult to give a proper account of the features or characteristics that go into a 
                                                             
28 It seems every human action can be explicable in terms of a larger project, which in turn is explicable as being 
part of one’s sense of a good human life. 
29 Foot, Natural Goodness, 42. 
30 This too is open to debate. One aspect of this chapter that I want to emphasize is its focus on the human ability to 
evaluate one’s own life and find meaning given the facts of that life. Someone may find equal or greater meaning in 
the adoption of a child than they would have in giving birth to a child. This ability consciously to shift one’s projects 
in light of environmental developments seems uniquely human. 
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description of a good bee (given the different ends each particular bee may have) than it is to 
give the same type of description in regard to an oak tree, it will be more difficult to give a 
proper account of what characteristics or dispositions humans should have in order to flourish, 
given the complexity of what it means for a human to flourish and the different means each 
human may take in order to realize such flourishing, than it is to give any such account for non-
rational animals. In Foot’s own words:  
In spite of the diversity of human goods—the elements that can make up good human 
lives—it is therefore possible that the concept of a good human life plays the same part in 
determining goodness of human characteristics and operations that the concept of 
flourishing plays in the determination of goodness in plants and animals.31  
 
This is a rather optimistic view, and in order to support it one hopes that Foot would give a 
description of what goes into a flourishing human life or telos. It is my contention that this hope 
is realized only imperfectly in Foot’s account. Before I move on to this argument, though, it will 
be helpful to show what sort of detail Foot does provide for her project. 
 
6. Natural Normativity in Action 
 I begin this section with a lengthy quote from Foot, because I think it shows clearly what 
she leaves open in her investigation of human good. She writes: 
[The h]uman good must indeed be recognized as different from good in the world of 
plants and animals, where good consisted in success in the cycle of development, self-
maintenance, and reproduction. Human good is sui generis. Nevertheless, I maintain that 
a common conceptual structure remains. For there is a ‘natural-history story’ about how 
human beings achieve this good as there is about how plants and animals achieve theirs. 
There are truths such as ‘Humans make clothes and build houses’ that are to be compared 
with ‘Birds grow feathers and build nests’; but also propositions such as ‘Humans 
establish rules of conduct and recognize rights’. To determine what is goodness and what 
defect of character, disposition, and choice, we must consider what human good is and 
how human beings live: in other words, what kind of a living thing a human being is.32 
 
                                                             
31 Foot, Natural Goodness, 44. 
32 Foot, Natural Goodness, 51. Emphasis added. 
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She moves from this statement concerning the human good to a discussion of practical 
rationality, understood as the capacity to recognize reasons for particular actions in light of their 
relation to the human good. But we still have to ask the question: Where have we established 
what the human good, the good that practical rationality is supposed to direct us to, is? She 
writes33 that she has already suggested the grounds on which a human being could be appraised 
as a bad (defective) human being, namely, that which does not promote the human good, but 
such an answer is not informative. 
 It may be possible to glean, from certain examples used by Foot, a meaningful description 
of how she views the human good. She has, for instance, at several points gestured at what may 
be a start to pinning down specific Aristotelian necessities for the human good. In this section, I 
will attempt to derive from these Aristotelian necessities a sketch of what the good may look 
like.  
 One example Foot uses is the type of larynx that allows for the production of sound 
necessary for language, as well as the mental capacity such that we can understand language and 
use it ourselves.34 She writes:  
There are, for instance, physical properties such as the kind of larynx that allows of the 
myriad sounds that make up human language, as well as the kind of hearing that can 
distinguish them…Without such things human beings may survive and reproduce 
themselves, but they are deprived.  And what could be more natural than to say on this 
account that we have introduced the subject of possible human defects; calling them 
‘natural defects’ as we used these terms in the discussion of plant and animal life? 
 
From this we can gather that Foot believes language plays a role in the good human life and 
certain necessary features (larynx shape, ability to hear, and mental capacity) need to be present 
if the human has any hope of achieving this good life.  
 She takes this argument a step further, bringing her comments closer to our general notion 
                                                             
33 See Foot, Natural Goodnes, 53. 
34 Foot, Natural Goodness, 43. 
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of morality, when she discusses promise keeping. Here she focuses on our social nature and 
remarks that “much human good hangs on the possibility of one person being able to bind 
another’s will by something in the nature of a promise or other contract.”35 She goes on to 
characterize promising as “mak[ing] use of a special kind of tool invented by humans for the 
better conduct of their lives, creating an obligation that (although not absolute) contains in its 
nature an obligation that harmlessness does not annul.”36 I have certain reservations about 
agreeing with Foot’s discussion of our capacity for speech as an Aristotelian necessity,37 but her 
comments concerning promising seem absolutely correct to me. There remains a question, 
however, as to what makes them correct. Foot alludes to,38 and here I will expand upon, the fact 
that humans are a remarkably needy species. Human infancy is extremely long when compared 
to the infancy of other species, and it takes years for us to reach a level of maturity at which we 
can be self-sufficient. In addition, we have needs for food and clothing, shelter, as well as 
education.39 
 All of these factors point to a great degree of complexity in our relation to our environment 
and our survival. Furthermore, as Foot has already pointed out, while survival in one sense is 
necessary for the human good it is not all that goes into the human good. We have to add to this 
certain other factors, for instance friendship and love, as well as the ability to enter into personal 
projects not directly pertaining to survival. All of these things rely on our ability to trust others. 
Humans need to delegate tasks to ensure that all our needs for survival are met. Trust that these 
jobs will be completed requires the “tool” of promising. Finally, if we have any hope of 
                                                             
35 Foot, Natural Goodness, 45.  Again Foot notes her indebtedness to Anscombe’s “On Promising and its Justice.” 
36 Foot, Natural Goodness, 51. 
37 I will take up this discussion below. 
38 See Foot, Natural Goodness, 45. 
39 “Education” does not need to be understood in any academic sense. Rather, it can be seen as teaching the next 
generation how to provide food, clothing, and shelter. 
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achieving not just survival but also a good life that contains creative projects, we need leisure 
time. This leisure time can only be ensured through cooperative efforts within the society. From 
this, we can see that the tool of promising plays an extremely important role in human life. 
 Putting this into Foot’s discussion of natural normativity, the ability to make and keep 
promises needs to be present if we hope to achieve a good human life. Practical reason is 
supposed to recognize promise keeping as an Aristotelian necessity and guide actions 
accordingly. Presumably, what grounds this whole framework are the natural facts concerning 
the particular neediness of humans in regard to our relationship with the environment, taking into 
account as well the needs beyond survival that must go into a description of the good human life. 
 
7. Rationality and the Problems it Poses to Natural Normativity 
 In the last section, I looked to Foot’s examples to build an explanation for why promise 
keeping is an Aristotelian necessity, which, when recognized as such by practical reason, 
becomes action guiding in that it is a disposition one ought to promote. I now want to go back to 
what I said earlier concerning Foot’s belief that the distinction between natural evaluations of 
plants and animals and natural evaluations of humans is one simply of complexity. What grounds 
the evaluative criteria of natural normativity is the teleological description one can give for each 
species. The end is flourishing, and what goes into this flourishing will depend on the species. In 
order to begin to give a description, we have to ask what characteristic way of living that species 
has.  
 Now the question is: Can we give the same sort of description of a characteristically human 
way of living? There are facts about our existence, but it seems impossible to give an account of 
the necessary role these facts play in a human life. We adapt and change, often finding new and 
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better ways to live. We are not static in the way we live as other animals are. What makes 
plasticity in human life possible is that we can rationally investigate the way we are living and 
make changes where we think changes are called for. This ability to re-evaluate on-the-go, so to 
speak, makes it very difficult to give any general description of human life.40 If we cannot give 
such a description then it seems Foot’s project, while possibly supporting virtue-type language,41 
fails to fix what those virtue terms mean in particular situations. 
 Looking back to the example Foot uses concerning an ill-formed larynx, we can see that 
individuals with such ‘handicaps’ often live remarkably flourishing lives, and this is possible not 
despite their ‘handicap’ but because of it. When someone confronts a physical abnormality in 
such a way that it is made into an asset we can see where the analogy between human and non-
human animals breaks down. A mute human who embraces the mute community and who finds 
meaningful work in aiding others to embrace their physical abnormality in the same way can be 
seen in many ways as being better set up to develop the dispositions or character traits necessary 
to live a flourishing life than some individuals who do not have any such abnormalities.42 Given 
the openness of possible human lives, sometimes it is the case that having an abnormality that 
must be either embraced or overcome can serve to make apparent to the individual what is 
important and what is not when evaluating one’s life. Those who have never been forced to 
perform such an evaluation of their own life may in fact be at a disadvantage.  This possibility is 
one Foot seems to ignore. For this reason an abnormality need not always be described as a 
                                                             
40 Beyond its simply being guided by reason. Foot clearly wants more than this, and for good reason. Why reason 
alone cannot be the answer I hope will be seen to be a common thread throughout this thesis. 
41 “Virtue-type language” because the virtue terms we use would only be temporary place-holders for particular 
dispositions that could fall out of favor given the way human life develops.  What I want to do is find some way to 
fix certain dispositions as virtues, making the claim that no human life can flourish without such a disposition. 
42 I do not mean to belittle the challenges that face individuals with different capabilities. Nor do I mean that taking 
such a stance on one’s abnormality is particularly common.  My point is only that sometimes when these difficulties 
are overcome a rich and flourishing life is made apparent, and this possibility only exists for those who first have an 
obstacle to this flourishing that needs to be overcome. 
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handicap, and, most importantly, we can make sense of a person who claims she would not 
exchange her life with the abnormality for one in which it was absent.  
  In plants and animals, abnormalities may arise that cause us to question what is or is not 
naturally normative for a species in terms of the teleological account of that species. Ultimately, 
though, we think there is a fact of the matter in this regard.  However, by means of our 
rationality, we humans actively redefine our conceptions of natural human behavior and the ends 
towards which it ought to aim. Rosalind Hursthouse describes the problem thus: “But in virtue of 
our rationality...we are different [from animals]. Apart from obvious physical constraints and 
possible psychological constraints, there is no knowing what we can do from what we do do, 
because we can assess what we do do and at least try to change it.”43 Alternate possibilities can 
always present themselves to our rationality. What at first may have appeared to be an 
Aristotelian necessity (the shape of a human larynx for example) can drop away in a new, still 
human, form of life.44 John McDowell takes this point a step farther, writing: “As soon as we 
conceive nature in a way that makes it begin to seem sensible to look there for a grounding for 
the rationality of virtuous behaviour, the supposed grounding is in trouble from the logical 
impotence of ‘Aristotelian categoricals [necessities].’ Reason enables a deliberating agent to step 
back from anything that might be a candidate to ground its putative requirements.”45 Human 
functioning is remarkably varied, and trying to pick out certain traits that make for optimal 
human functioning seems to be a lost cause. We can always take certain ways of living and 
improve upon them, or see opportunities for living better in situations that at first seem to inhibit 
                                                             
43 Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, 221.  She is not making the claim that I have no way of distinguishing my actual 
from my possible actions; rather, her claim is that when we do something we can always rationally evaluate our 
action and ask whether it was the best possible action.  I take this evaluation to allow for a recognition in the agent 
of multiple possibilities from which they must choose.  This gives rise to a uniquely human predicament where the 
goodness or badness of my life is made up in large part by the choices I make. 
44 What allows for the continuity in regard to it being a new human way of life will be discussed in the next chapter. 
45 McDowell, “Two Sorts of Naturalism,” 173.  
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flourishing. For this reason, it seems there is no one recipe for the best way to live a human life 























Chapter III: An Internal and Evaluative Naturalism Through Neurathian Reflection 
1. Introduction 
 In the last chapter I argued that Foot’s naturalism relies on a teleological account of species 
realism concerning human nature that exist external to our own moral outlook. By external here I 
am referring to Foot’s belief that a general enough statement can be made concerning human 
nature that, regardless of what we believe to be ethical, that statement would hold true; or, to put 
it another way, if our ethical beliefs are true they are so because of these natural facts. I 
suggested that such a view becomes problematic when we allow for a pluralism of types of 
human lives and the role reason plays in overcoming what would otherwise be considered 
obstacles to flourishing. Furthermore, I called into question the teleological framework Foot 
relies on in order to express stability in nature, stability that seems necessary if her project is to 
find objective moral truths.  
 In this chapter I will investigate how we might be able to provide a type of moral realism 
without reliance on teleological categorizations of nature. This argument relies on radical,46 
rational ethical reflection upon our own acquired moral beliefs. Several philosophers have 
offered versions of such a thesis, and part of my task here will be to put these different versions 
into conversation, piecing together what I take to be the most promising aspects of each in order 
to create a coherent whole. In order to do so I will first look at the positions put forward by John 
McDowell and Martha Nussbaum.47 Ultimately, I will conclude that the type of naturalism 
presented by these philosophers does provide us with a criteria by which we can pick out virtues 
and vices, one that avoids the problems I have argued Foot’s naturalism falls into. However, the 
claim that a full blown moral realism is achieved remains questionable.  
                                                             
46 “Radical” here is McDowell’s description.  I take it to be radical in the sense that it holds no principles as 
foundational and thus all principles are susceptible to revision. 
47 I look at Rosalind Hursthouse’s position in the next chapter. 
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2. McDowell’s Argument Against an External View of Natural Facts 
 John McDowell, in “Two Sorts of Naturalism,” distinguishes between a naturalized ethics 
that seeks validation through “independent facts, underwritten by nature, about what it is for a 
human life to go well”48 and a naturalized ethics that works from within one’s formed character, 
seeking validation only in “radical ethical reflection” upon those same character traits and how 
they relate to one another, in order to understand what it means for a human life to go well. He 
worries, and I have argued, that Foot’s position is aligned with the first form of naturalism. 
Moreover, he argues that a desire for such a naturalism comes from a misreading of Aristotle 
made possible by the effect Kant has had on our thinking. This misreading has resulted in a 
skewed understanding of objectivity. By recognizing the Kantian influence on our thoughts 
about nature, McDowell argues, we will be better able to confront the question of how Aristotle 
himself sees the virtues as naturally grounded.49 
 So, what is this Kantian influence that we need to recognize in order to escape? A full 
explication is beyond the scope of this paper and, of course, has already been given by 
McDowell himself in the aforementioned article. However, the crux of the issue, in McDowell’s 
own words, is that “[t]he ineffable ‘in itself’ in Kant’s picture performs the function of satisfying 
a felt need to recognize something wholly alien to subjectivity; and Kant’s insight that the 
natural world, just because it is not ineffable, cannot take over that function.”50 A new way of 
looking at the world became possible with Kant’s philosophy. We are asked to entertain the 
existence of the world devoid of our own, human, rational influence. Such a move makes 
                                                             
48 McDowell, “Two Sorts of Naturalism,” 167-8. 
49 Both McDowell and Nussbaum give arguments for interpreting Aristotle in this way as well as for this project’s 
being a more promising ground from which to build an ethics. For the purposes of this thesis I have bracketed the 
interpretive question. However, for narrative flow and in order to account for the language used in certain quotes, I 
have found it necessary for the time being to work within the perspective of the interpretive thesis. My argument in 
no way hinges on whether or not the position described here was actually Aristotle’s project. 
50 McDowell, “Two Sorts of Naturalism,” 180. 
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possible the position that the world as we know it is a product of this human rational influence, 
the stance taken by transcendental idealism. However, this leaves us with the realization that 
while we can entertain the possibility of the world existing devoid of our intellectual influence, 
we a fortiori have no intellectual access to this world. That our claims about nature are grounded 
only in our human understanding introduces a desire to give them further grounding in some 
objectivity external to this human understanding.51 When we discover the ‘in-itself’ cannot serve 
this purpose, we seek “disenchanted nature” as the next best thing. This gives rise to the 
scientific approach and the pedestal upon which it is placed. McDowell writes: “The 
investigative stance of science discounts for the effects of features of the investigator, even his 
humanity ... [W]hat science aims to discover is the nature of reality in so far as it can be 
characterized in absolute terms: the content of the view from nowhere.”52  
 McDowell argues that it is from the scientific perspective that we have interpreted Aristotle 
as seeking an objective natural ground for morality. The standard interpretation of Aristotle is 
that he is grounding his ethics on human nature, understood as certain objective facts 
discoverable by science about what we are and how we function. Foot, I have argued, can be 
understood as being tied to this line of argument.  McDowell argues that if this perspective is 
peculiar to modern philosophy, it is illegitimate as an interpretive model for Aristotle. 
Furthermore, if it runs into serious issues concerning its viability as an ethical foundation, then 
we have good reason to look elsewhere to understand what grounds our normative statements. 
He goes on to suggest that if we remove the idealistic stance whereby nature is some 
conglomeration of the ‘in-itself’ and our own understanding, dropping this “hankering” for the 
                                                             
51 Kant avoids this move, as McDowell rightfully notes, but the move itself is made possible by the separation that 
Kant introduces between the noumena and the phenomena. Ultimately, McDowell believes, it is a ‘hankering’ for 
the in-itself that dooms Kantianism as well. 
52 McDowell, “Two Sorts of Naturalism,” 181. 
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‘in-itself’ altogether, then “the thesis that the natural world is in the space of logos [our 
understanding] need not seem to be a form of the thesis that thought makes the world.”53 By 
removing the idealistic thesis and allowing for a conception of objectivity that does not preclude 
the subjectivity of the thinking questioner we can come to an ethical validation that respects our 
being situated within nature.54 Ethical reasoning then takes place from within this situated human 
perspective, and it has for its fodder those moral beliefs with which it is already engaged. 
 
3. Nussbaum’s Internal and Evaluative, “Self-Validating,” Arguments 
 The Aristotle we get from such an interpretation is remarkably similar to the Aristotle 
described by Nussbaum in “Aristotle on Human Nature and the Foundations of Ethics.” 
Nussbaum’s paper targets Bernard Williams and his interpretation of Aristotle in particular.55  
She picks out three theses of Williams’ interpretation against which she will argue, all of which, 
I believe, may be applied to Foot’s position as well. William’s first thesis, according to 
Nussbaum, is that the essential human nature56 for Aristotle is a natural scientific fact that can be 
grasped from “the totally external viewpoint of a neutral observer—from, as [William’s puts it in 
                                                             
53 McDowell, “Two Sorts of Naturalism,” 181. 
54 What this may look like will be taken up in what immediately follows. 
55 McDowell also points to Williams as someone who holds the Aristotelian interpretation he believes should be 
overthrown. Nussbaum acknowledges that Williams’ interpretation is one that is “share[d] with numerous influential 
writers, past and present.” (Nussbaum, “Aristotle on Human Nature and the Foundation of Ethics” [hereafter 
“Human Nature”], 87, as well as footnote 2 (124), which contains a list of examples). One notable adherent to this 
reading other than Williams is T.H. Irwin who, in “The Metaphysical and Psychological Basis of Aristotle’s Ethics,” 
traces what he believes to be the necessary foundation behind the concept of eudaimonia Aristotle uses in his ethics 
from the Metaphysics to the Physics and finally the understanding of the soul in De Anima.  In so doing he argues 
directly against the endoxic approach McDowell and Nussbaum take.  Irwin concludes: [Aristotle] is sometimes 
supposed to regard ordinary language and ordinary beliefs as the final arbiter of the correctness of an ethical theory; 
the theory should begin from the difficulties raised by common beliefs and try to make the beliefs coherent, 
pronouncing all or most of them true.  This conception of ethical argument is not just the misinterpretation of 
readers anxious to find their respect for common sense and ordinary language reflected in Aristotle; Aristotle 
himself describes his method in similar terms (1145b2-7).  If my argument has been sound, it has shown that this 
conception of Aristotle’s ethical method is at best a half-truth” (Irwin, 50-51).  
56 “Essential” here meaning necessary in the sense of Aristotelian categorical as apposed to any reified essense. 
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Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy], ‘an absolute understanding of human nature.’”57  
Furthermore, essential human nature, and the natural scientific facts of which it is composed, is 
stable (i.e., it cannot be changed by humans themselves). Second, essential human nature is not 
open to the same sort of controversy that ethical questions are open to. There is a fact of the 
matter concerning what is necessary for a good human life, and this fact is discoverable by 
scientific inquiry and is objective for this reason. And third, this essential human nature does 
important ethical work. Its source, external to human opinion, provides “fixed points that 
effectively rule out certain ethical alternatives.”58 Importantly, Williams argues that these are 
theses held by Aristotle himself, and ultimately it is the first thesis that, Williams argues, forces 
us to reject Aristotle’s ethics.59 Nussbaum counters that Aristotle has no such conception of an 
external foundation for ethics, nor even science for that matter. The type of investigation 
Aristotle pursues takes for granted that all investigation is performed internal to a human 
perspective. She writes: “to find out what our nature is seems to be one and the same thing as to 
find out what we deeply believe to be most important and indispensable [i.e. the internal 
perspective from which the inquiry begins].”60 A little further on she writes: “Human nature 
cannot, and need not, be validated from the outside, because human nature just is an inside 
perspective, not a thing at all, but rather the most fundamental and broadly shared experiences of 
human beings living and reasoning together.”61 
                                                             
57 My contention is that this use of ‘external’ maps onto McDowell’s argument that we, in science, try to get outside 
of our own perspective and grasp the way things are in themselves.  This perspective is often described as the view 
from nowhere.  I will be using ‘external’ in this manner throughout this thesis.  On a related note, I will be using 
‘internal’ to indicate a perspective that does not try to strip away preconceptions, opinions, and beliefs; rather, the 
internal perspective seeks to test the coherence of these beliefs by examining their relation to one another.  I see this 
as very much in line with Rawlsian “reflective equilibrium.” 
58 Nussbaum, “Human Nature,” 88. 
59 Although Williams concludes in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy that all strong moral theses confront such 
limits, and that ultimately an Aristotelian-type ethics is probably the best we can do (minus the external foundation). 
60 Nussbaum, “Human Nature,” 106. 
61 Nussbaum, “Human Nature,” 121. 
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 The question now turns to how we come to recognize these fundamental experiences that 
are to serve as the natural foundations for our ethics. Nussbaum seeks to show that Aristotle’s 
ethics are grounded in endoxa, what she takes to be the reasoned beliefs of wise individuals.62 
She rejects any attempt to ground ethics on a foundation external to our own beliefs, and fully 
embraces the fact that a viewpoint is always already presupposed in any investigation into what 
it means to be human. In order to motivate her position, Nussbaum begins with some passages 
from the Nicomachean Ethics that discuss the proper way we should wish for the good of our 
friends and for ourselves. The passages are worth quoting at length as they introduce 
Nussbaum’s strategy well. She writes: 
If it is well said that a friend wishes goods for his friend for that person’s own sake, then 
that person will have to remain the type of being he is. Then it is to him as a human being 






Being is a good thing for the good person, and each person wishes good things for 
himself. But nobody would choose to have everything on condition of becoming other—
as, for example, the god right now has the good. He will wish to have the good while 
continuing to be whatever he is.64  
 
The important feature of both of these passages is that they point to a limitation concerning what 
can be considered good for a person. If what is wished for would prohibit someone from 
maintaining her identity as a human being, an identity that is based solely on one’s beliefs about 
what it means to be a human, then it does not make any sense for that person to wish for that 
thing, because it would not be that person who succeeded in obtaining it.  
                                                             
62 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (hereafter NE), 1095a15-1095b13 for some textual evidence for such a 
reading. While endoxa, strictly speaking, has a much larger extension than the reasoned beliefs of wise individuals, 
Aristotle, understandably, restricts his own ethical investigation to what he takes to be the most plausible and widely 
held beliefs.  I take Nussbaum to be using this narrower sense of endoxa as a technical term that she has taken from  
Aristotle on the grounds of the above referenced textual support. 
63 Nussbaum, “Human Nature,” 90; NE 1159a8-12. Translation and bracketed comments are Nussbaum’s.  
64 Nussbaum, “Human Nature,” 90; NE 1166a19. Again, translation is Nussbaum’s. 
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 Importantly, this identity must be established communally.65 Nussbaum’s next move is to 
give two paradigm cases for how we may acquire a communal conception of humanity that will 
serve as a foundation for non-relative moral beliefs. She frames these cases as “self-validating”66 
arguments for our rational and social nature. Aristotle defines a human being as a rational and 
social animal, so Nussbaum looks for endoxic foundations for components of our nature.67 The 
first of these arguments looks to Plato’s Philebus in order to illustrate the importance we place 
on rationality in our understanding of humanity.68 The dialogue asks what the good is for a 
human being. The contenders are pleasure, knowledge, and some combination of the two such 
that, when they are put together, they form a third. In order to see whether pleasure or knowledge 
could be sufficient for the good of man, Socrates suggests looking at each separately from the 
other.69 He asks Protarchus whether he would want to live a life experiencing nothing but 
pleasure. Protarchus answers in the affirmative. Socrates then asks whether he might have some 
need of knowledge or intelligence. Protarchus answers that he does not see why he would need 
either if his life was one of nothing but the greatest pleasure. To this, Socrates answers that if 
Protarchus were to be devoid of knowledge and intelligence he would also be ignorant about the 
very question of whether or not he was enjoying himself. Without memory, Protarchus could not 
experience anything but the present moment, so he could not say if he has enjoyed himself. 
Without the ability to judge, Protarchus would not be able to tell whether or not he ever is in fact 
                                                             
65 I mean communal in the broadest sense possible. Ultimately Nussbaum believes her position gives us reason to 
reject any sort of relativism. 
66 What she means by “self-validating” will be discussed below. 
67 I am using ‘humanity’ here to denote the necessary conditions for one’s being a human being. 
68 One may reasonably ask why we need to look to Plato if the argument is meant to be Aristotelian. First, 
Nussbaum takes the Philebus simply to be a good example of the point Aristotle expresses in the above quotes. 
Perhaps Aristotle produced his own literary examples in some of his lost works, but as all that are left are his notes I 
think this is a justified supplementation on the part of Nussbaum. Second, my goal is to judge the promise of this 
approach in a contemporary ethics, so any interpretive qualms one may still have of Nussbaum’s use of this example 
should not apply to my case. 
69 Plato, Philebus, 20e. 
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enjoying himself. And finally, without the ability to calculate, Protarchus could not look towards 
future pleasures.70 From these results, Socrates argues “[y]ou would thus not live a human life 
but the life of a mollusk or of one of those creatures in shells that live in the sea.”71 
 Nussbaum sees important ethical work being done in this argument. She stresses that 
Socrates’ questions are always formed as direct questions to Protarchus. The question is not 
whether some hypothetical person could choose such a life, but whether Protarchus could. This, 
she argues, is part of the internal evaluative process that goes into the question of what is the 
human good. Protarchus cannot give an affirmative answer to the question whether he would 
choose such a life because he could not choose the life while maintaining his own conception of 
what it means to be human. He identifies himself as a member of human kind, and in wishing to 
live the life of pleasure alone he would be wishing to live a life that is outside of his own 
conception of what it means to be human. Protarchus could not choose such a life for himself 
because it would not be him who was successful in living such a life.72 In Nussbaum’s own 
words: “The good life for him (for us) must first of all be a life for him (for us).”73 
 The argument can go the other way as well. We could not live the life of pure intellect, a 
god’s life, for similar reasons. The life of pure intellect fails because we cannot, as humans, 
choose such a life. Such a life would be that of some rarified being alien to humanity and all of 
its beliefs and concerns. One may be able to acknowledge the good of such a being, but it is not a 
human good, so one could never wish it for oneself qua human.74 Here we find the boundary at 
                                                             
70 Plato, Philebus, 21a-d. 
71 Plato, Philebus, 21d. 
72 Note that this statement does not require any metaphysical notion of personhood. Protarchus would not be 
successful in living such a life because Protarchus has a certain conception of what sort of life is possible for 
Protarchus to live. He can fool himself into thinking that the life of a mollusk is such a life, but in the act of thinking 
he has already shown that it is not a mollusk. 
73 Nussbaum, “Human Nature,” 99-100. 
74 This may be passing over the question a little too quickly, particularly in light of what Aristotle writes in Book X 
of the Nicomachean Ethics, with emphasis on 1177b27-1178a9. The scholarly discussion over Book X’s place in 
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the opposite end of the spectrum. It is as inconsistent for an embodied human to wish for the 
pure intellect of a god as it is for her to wish for the simple pleasures of a mollusk. Any 
definition of the good life for a human, eudaimonia, will fall somewhere between these two 
limits. Nussbaum calls this form of argument “internal” and “evaluative” because it never 
departs from the opinions held by the individual. What it does, is refine these opinions by 
making apparent the inconsistencies that they often contain; this refinement then makes clear to 
the individual that he or she already has internally motivating reasons for certain actions—
reasons that were simply concealed by other pre-reflectively held opinions. 
 Above I said that Nussbaum describes the internal and evaluative position of human nature 
as “self-validating.” Before moving to her argument concerning our social nature and mores, 
which are supposed to be self-validating in the same sense, I need to show what she is pointing 
to with this description. Nussbaum believes the argument’s “procedures embody a respect for 
practical reason; they acknowledge the importance of practical reason to living humanly well.”75 
When we perform the evaluative process, we place a degree of value on practical reason. That 
practical reason is then valued in our conception of what is required in order to maintain human 
identity should not be surprising. The position states that there is a circularity in our argument 
concerning what human nature is, but that this circularity is not problematic because it brings to 
light what we are unable to change without a complete shift in what it means to be human. We 
cannot enter into the investigation of what it means to be human without presupposing, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Aristotle’s ethics is immense and beyond the scope of this paper. I will limit myself to pointing to what is said 
immediately after the above-mentioned lines. Aristotle remarks: “Life in conformity with the other kind of virtue 
[moral] will be happy in a secondary degree, because activities in accordance with it are human” (NE 1178a10-11). 
One cannot live a purely intellectual life and still be human. This does not keep us from recognizing the higher god-
like good of the intellectual virtues and fostering them, but it does call into question whether or not it is at all 
rational to wish to be such a god oneself given Nussbaum’s argument. It seems impossible that such a commitment 
could be held without self-contradiction and it is not clear that Aristotle himself is suggesting that it ought to be 
attempted. Regardless, such considerations fall under the interpretive question, which I have said is not part of my 
goal here. 
75 Nussbaum, “Human Nature,” 101. 
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giving a certain value to, practical reason as an integral part of the conclusion. This 
presupposition is brought to light through the investigation itself, but it is also confirmed in the 
investigation. For this reason, a rejection of the conclusion would have to be a rejection of the 
entire project because it would force us to say the very asking of the question is illegitimate. The 
answer to the question “what does it mean to be human?” is, in a crucially important way, built 
into the very asking. 
 The second “self-validating” argument concerns our social nature and how we get brought 
into social mores through social situations themselves. Nussbaum begins this argument by 
pointing to the role that myths and theatre played in the ethical development of the ancient 
Greeks.76 She argues that the fictional transformations from human to god, god to human, human 
to animal, and animal to human serve to delineate the boundaries between what can and cannot 
be given up or taken on without our ceasing to be what we are. When we see these lines crossed 
in stories and plays, we are forced to reflect on our own socially constituted beliefs concerning 
what is considered human. These definitions may be narrower than the ones discovered in 
Plato’s Philebus because they entail a social conception that may be more refined. To take one 
example of several from Nussbaum, consider the Cyclops. These beings are described as mostly 
human in shape. Among the differences that distinguish the Cyclops from the human lie in the 
Cyclopses’ complete disregard for one another. When we hear stories of the Cyclops, we can 
evaluate what it is about them that keeps them from being human. One necessary requirement for 
being human that the Cyclops fail to meet is found in their inability to enter into social 
engagements. We find such an ability peculiarly necessary for our identity as human. The 
process of reflection and evaluation itself is communal because it takes place within society. We 
                                                             
76 Presumably this type of development, mutatis mutandis, can be shown in our own culture through our fairy tales, 
educational systems, modes of entertainment, etc. 
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go to the play to see the story, and in going we are surrounded by others. “The communal nature 
of this reflective process, and the fact that it works through emotional responses to tragic events, 
suggests that the process of participating in the exercise is already an affirmation of its 
content.”77 Once again, the means by which the argument is presented presupposes the 
commitments that we find necessary for our continued identity. “The ‘argument’ is self-
validating in a deep way; you cannot withdraw your assent from its conclusion, without 
withdrawing from the entire form of life that, as a procedure, it embodies.”78 
 Nussbaum believes that both “self-validating” arguments, the first for our rational human 
nature and the second for our social nature, are identical in form. This form consists in the 
necessary presupposition of the conclusion such that when the argument is complete and we 
recognize the circularity we gain a further understanding that the method of argumentation is 
what justifies our use of the conclusion as a premise. The argument could not proceed in any 
other way. 
 
4. McDowell and Nussbaum: The Same Sort of Naturalism 
 While Nussbaum has provided us with a form for understanding the foundations of 
naturalism understood as internal to and evaluative of our own beliefs (endoxa), she only 
suggests what the content of such a naturalism may be.79 What form does our social nature take, 
and, more importantly, is this the form it ought to take? Following Nussbaum we answer the first 
part of this question with our pre-theoretical social and moral beliefs. But this answer forces us 
to ask how we are to know those beliefs are in fact the right ones to have, which leads back to 
                                                             
77 Nussbaum, “Human Nature,” 98. 
78 Nussbaum, “Human Nature,” 98. 
79 In the form of ancient examples. If we are to apply such an argument to contemporary ethical conversation we 
need to update the examples. 
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McDowell’s discussion of conceptual schemes and the internal evaluation they undergo through 
Neurathian reflection. I turn now to a description of this process and an argument for how we can 
fruitfully see it as an extension of Nussbaum’s foundation.  
 McDowell looks back to Aristotle’s espoused method of investigation for his ethics. 
Aristotle asks whether we should start from first principles or work our way to first principles 
from what we already know, concluding that the latter method, working our way back to first 
principles, is the only feasible way to make a study of ethics. What are these first principles? 
Aristotle writes: “For the facts are the starting point, and if they are sufficiently plain to him, he 
will not need the reason as well; and the man who has been well brought up has or can easily get 
starting points.”80 One’s upbringing is indicated as the starting point for all ethical inquiry, 
meaning one must always begin from an acquired ethical perspective. I take it that what is being 
suggested here is the way into the circle of the self-validating argument. 
 According to McDowell, we can then evaluate this acquired ethical perspective from the 
inside in order to determine whether or not it is correct. We can do so because our habituation 
into an ethical perspective is not simply rote learning or behavioral training. Instead it is an 
introduction into a conceptual framework.81 We come to learn what actions are the right actions 
given the framework of the virtues. From this we come to an understanding of what McDowell 
calls the that of an ethics. We understand that this is the right action in this particular 
circumstance. Our upbringing allows us to pick out and take enjoyment in performing virtuous 
actions because such actions are understood as noble. When we have this sort of habituation we 
have the that of Aristotle’s ethics.  
If we left things here Aristotle would seem susceptible to a charge of leaving his ethics 
                                                             
80 NE 1095b3-6 
81 See McDowell, “Some Issues in Aristotle’s Moral Psychology,” 38-40. Much of his discussion concerning moral 
habituation and learning is in turn taken from Burnyeat’s “Aristotle on Learning to be Good.” 
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without any hope of objectivity whatsoever. However, McDowell’s suggestion, and this seems 
supported by what Aristotle says at NE 1095b3-9, is that once we have the that of a conceptual 
ethical framework we can then move to the because, the point at which we come to understand 
why these virtues are in fact the right ones.82 This move requires an honest examination of one’s 
conceptual framework from the inside. McDowell likens it to Socrates’ call to an examined 
life.83  It is through this move that Aristotle escapes dogmatic acceptance of one’s ethical 
perspective. Certain supposedly virtuous actions are called into question in light of our other 
beliefs. In this way we can internally evaluate what we have acquired through habituation. 
 McDowell introduces the model of Neurathian reflection to the ethical conceptual 
framework provided through one’s upbringing to illustrate this point. If we cannot get outside of 
our acquired ethical perspective then we must try to fix it from the inside.84 The metaphor of 
Neurath’s boat is supposed to show how such an examination of our ethical beliefs is to take 
place. The idea is that once one has been brought into the conceptual framework, in other words 
once one can recognize, occasion by occasion, what the correct action is (the that or starting 
point of NE 1095b3-9), then one can begin to see how it all hangs together in a coherent ethical 
picture. Once one has reached this point the next move is to begin to question elements of that 
picture in light of other elements of that very same picture. McDowell writes: “In this version of 
the image [of Neurath’s boat], the fact that the boat cannot be put ashore for overhaul stands for 
the fact that when one reflectively moves from mere possession of the that to possession of the 
because as well, one has no material to exploit except the initially unreflective perceptions of the 
                                                             
82 See also Burnyeat, “Aristotle on Learning to be Good,” 72-74. 
83 See McDowell, “Eudaimonism and Realism in Aristotle’s Ethics,” 212. 
84 Looking back to Nussbaum, its not just that we can give self-validating arguments concerning our nature, its that 
we can give only self-validating arguments concerning our nature. That we are unable to escape the circle is itself a 
natural fact. 
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that from which the reflection starts.”85 It is the task of practical reason then to facilitate the 
move from the that to the because, and in understanding the because one stands on firm ground 
concerning the truth of one’s ethical perspective.  
 An important step is made in opening one’s ethical perspective up to such a Neurathian 
evaluation and possible revision. According to McDowell it is in this that we are able to maintain 
a form of moral realism. He writes: “[I]f a collection of putative perceptions of the that has run 
that risk and passed muster, that is surely some reason to suppose that the perceptions are 
veridical.”86 We get validation of our ethics through such a Neurathian evaluation and we have 
no reason to ask for more (nor any evidence that more than this sort of certainty is possible). 
 
5. What Sort of Ethical Realism? 
 Given such a picture of ethical discourse the question that needs to be asked is: How do we 
know when we are getting it right? If all we have are our beliefs, and any ethical discourse has 
commerce only in these beliefs, it seems that ethical discussions could dissolve into irredeemable 
relativism. To put the problem into McDowell’s framework, there might end up being multiple, 
self-contained conceptual schemes, each giving their own definition of human flourishing in a 
language the others cannot understand. Continuing with the analogy of Neurath’s boat, we can 
make sense of the crew repairing the boat only if we include some knowledge within the minds 
of the crew of what a boat is and how it is supposed to operate. The sailors must have an idea of 
the purpose or limitations of a boat before the repairs they make upon their vessel can be 
successful. In other words, there is a certain structure that makes a boat a boat, and before we go 
about making repairs we need to come to some understanding of this structure lest we wind up 
                                                             
85 McDowell, “Eudaimonism and Realism in Aristotle’s Ethics,” 213. 
86 McDowell, “Eudaimonism and Realism in Aristotle’s Ethics,” 214. 
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with an airplane when we are finished.87 It seems that without this understanding there can be no 
repairs, only arbitrary changes. The situation is the same with ethics. We need some picture of 
what our ethics are supposed to do before we can go about repairing them, or have any sense of 
when we are successful. Aristotle places eudaimonia in this position; our ethics are a necessary 
condition for our living the good life for humans. I have been arguing that the main distinction 
between the naturalism offered by McDowell and Nussbaum and the naturalism offered by Foot 
can be traced to how we understand eudaimonia. Foot’s naturalistic answer looks to external and 
objective facts concerning the human species. She argues that there is a characteristic way in 
which humans live their lives, and from this characteristic way we can develop a firm 
understanding of what eudaimonia is. McDowell and Nussbaum look to a socially constructed 
conception of eudaimonia that seems to lack any (necessary) sense of stability. If the concept of 
eudaimonia is an open ended one, subject to constant revision through the above described 
Neurathian reflection, then it can hardly serve as a blueprint for that very same Neurathian 
reflection. In this section I will investigate how much of a foundationalism we can ascribe to 
either McDowell or Nussbaum’s position, and what this means for their ethics.88 
 Nussbaum claims to be providing a foundation through her account of self-validating 
internal arguments. However, even she recognizes that the foundation is not one that gets its 
strength from some inherent nature of human beings; instead, it gets its strength from the inquiry 
                                                             
87 If being finished is even a possibility. 
88 I take foundationalism here to be a solid ground from which we can then build an ethics.  Its important to note that 
McDowell eschews any sense of a foundationalism in his ethics, arguing that investigations that take that as their 
goal have already gone astray. However, since I have tried to draw a parallel between McDowell and Nussbaum, 
and Nussbaum does believe she is offering a form of foundationalism for her ethics, some sense needs to be made of 
this point. The key, I believe, is to recognize that the two foundations Nussbaum offers can operate as foundations 
only in tandem. If we take rationality as the foundation without the social context within which it needs to operate, 
we are left with an empty formalism. If we take the social foundation without rationality, then the ethical question 
could never be asked. It seems clear that the type of foundation Nussbaum believes she is providing is very different 
from the sort of foundation generally considered to be the goal (as in Williams for example). For this reason, I think 
we can still make sense of McDowell’s project and Nussbaum’s as seeking the same sort of ground. 
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through which it is discovered. Looking back to the example of Protarchus in the Philebus, she 
writes: “[A]lthough it is, in principle, open to Protarchus to reject its conclusion [the importance 
of practical reason for living well], he cannot consistently do so without opting out of the form of 
life that the Socratic procedure exemplifies.”89 This shows that the foundation provided by 
Nussbaum is a foundation only for a human who accepts certain norms and practices already,90 in 
this case the norms of practical reason, and not an understanding of being a human qua human 
(where ‘human’ here indicates some natural fact external to human beliefs). While this does 
indeed get us a good deal in terms of mapping out ethical inquiry, it also leaves us without a way 
to evaluate (and offer guidance to) humans who reject those norms outright. There is no small 
difference between Nussbaum’s foundation of accepting practical reason as part of our self-given 
identity and Foot’s maintaining that practical reason is a natural fact about humans. The 
distinction between Foot’s naturalism and Nussbaum’s has immense repercussions in regard to 
what we can say with certainty concerning morality. For instance, Nussbaum acknowledges that 
Philebus does “opt out” of the norms governing practical reason and ethical inquiry, and for this 
reason we cannot say that he is inconsistent. As such, our ethical evaluations do not really touch 
him. We are forced to say that Philebus’ form of life lies outside our ethical purview of a human 
life (‘human’ here understood as the internal structure of norms that form our identity). The 
result is that Philebus is consistent, and I, in calling Philebus sub-human,91 am consistent, but the 
two of us in relation to one another’s respective beliefs are irredeemably inconsistent. That such 
radical ethical difference could exist between two beings seems highly implausible. On the other 
hand, Foot’s naturalism, as it makes universal statements about what it means to be human, can 
still evaluate Philebus’ life in light of its relation to what it means to be human. Most 
                                                             
89 Nussbaum, “Human Nature,” 101.  
90 Or, in McDowell’s terms, someone who has already been inculcated into a conceptual framework. 
91 Or, at least, non-human. 
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importantly, Foot’s naturalism allows us to make moral judgments that touch other agents, even 
if those agents themselves do not understand how, or accept that they do. 
 Another worry for Nussbaum’s use of such a conception of a foundation is that it sets her 
up for a form of historical relativism. If our identity is defined by our practices, and this identity 
forms the ‘foundation,’ what happens if our practices change over time? We could develop 
radically different practices and yet the narrative of these changes would remain intact. This 
means one identity is not given over to another, but rather the same identity undergoes 
fundamental changes over time. What was moral for humans at one time would no longer be 
moral, and we could not look back on humans in the past and judge them according to our 
contemporary norms.92 These contemporary norms simply do not comply with the human 
identity at that past time. Without some fixed conception of what it means to be human such a 
predicament is possible given the foundation provided by Nussbaum. 
 Rosalind Hursthouse discusses this problem in relation to the Neurathian project. She 
writes: “For, in theory, Neurath’s boat might, over many years, become like Theseus’s ship, 
without a single plank of the original remaining. And then, in a manner of speaking, we, or our 
descendants, could look back at the ethical outlook within which we started and condemn it in 
retrospect as all wrong.”93 She follows this point up in a subsequent footnote, noting, “I say ‘in a 
manner of speaking’ because there is some question as to whether we, or our descendents, with 
our new outlook, could understand the original one well enough to describe it as ‘all wrong’. We 
                                                             
92 Strictly speaking we could judge them immoral but only in light of our own socially developed understanding of 
morality.  This is akin to how I can judge Philebus as immoral (or at least amoral) and be consistent. The problem is 
that this consistency never touches Philebus or those ‘humans’ from the past.  The difference between one internal 
point of view and the other does not allow for any communication between them (I take Gilbert Harman to be 
offering a relativism similar to this in “Moral Relativism Defended.” Philosophical Review 84 (1975): 3-22.  If there 
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We have, at the very least, pragmatic reasons to avoid such a relativism. I will show below that we also good 
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93 Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, 166. 
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might just find it completely incomprehensible, and thereby neither right nor wrong.”94 One must 
ask whether any ethical project with this outcome could still lay claim to the name of realism. 
My immediate reaction is that it cannot.  There are two reasons for why I have this reaction.  
First, to suggest that we descended from those who held such an incomprehensible ethical 
outlook seems to say too much.  If their outlook truly is incomprehensible to us then there is no 
reason to think that our ethical outlook in any way descended from theirs.  Second, and this is a 
point I will develop in the last chapter, it does not seem as though such a radical difference in 
ethical outlook is even possible given the necessary existential similarities between us and any 
other rational, temporally finite, subject of a life from which we have descended. 
 To sum up, the two weaknesses I see in Nussbaum’s foundationalism, and by extension 
McDowell’s Neurathian procedure, are that we are not provided with a way by which we can 
provide reasons for action to those who have opted out of our ethics (or, in McDowell’s 
phrasing, our conceptual scheme)95 and that we seem to leave open the possibility of an historical 









94 Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, footnote 5. 
95 I want to stress here that these reasons do not need to be accepted by the agent in question.  Rather, the claim is 
that they should be accepted by the agent, and the agent, insofar as they do not act on those reasons, is wrong. In 
other words, an agent need not be convinced that they are wrong in order to be wrong. 
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Chapter IV: Finding a Way Between the Horns of the Dilemma 
1. First Nature vs. Second Nature 
 Thus far I have argued that the various forms of naturalized normativity offered by Foot, 
McDowell, and Nussbaum all run into problems. The two sides of the problem I think can be 
helpfully illustrated by a distinction McDowell offers between first and second nature.96 
McDowell writes: 
Nature controls the behavior of a non-rational animal. It seemed that reason compels 
nature to abdicate that authority, leaving a void that self-interest seemed fitted to fill. But 
now we can see that the way reason distances one from first nature need not invite a coup 
d’etat from self-interest. In acquiring one’s second nature—that is, in acquiring logos—
one learned to take a distinctive pleasure in acting in certain ways, and one acquired 
conceptual equipment suited to characterize a distinctive worthwhileness one learned to 
see for actions, that is, a distinctive range of reasons one learned to see for acting in those 
ways.... The dictates of virtue have acquired an authority that replaces the authority 
abdicated by first nature with the onset of reason.97 
 
First order nature is the type of nature we discuss when we look at non-rational animals and how 
they behave. Their ends are dictated to them by nature and it is this dictation that makes possible 
discussion of Aristotelian necessities in reference to them.98 In short, this is the side from which 
Foot seeks to ground normativity. Investigations into the first nature of such non-rational animals 
are the proper realm of science. Rationality, according to McDowell, severs us from first nature 
as it pertains to humans. In its place is what he refers to as our second nature. Second nature can 
be understood as the virtues. Knowledge of the virtues is acquired through our taking on a 
conceptual scheme in the process of our moral education. We are brought up in particular ways 
and taught to value particular things. It is this nature that informs our choices and the 
                                                             
96 McDowell’s distinction can in turn be traced back to Hegel. Hegel writes in the Introduction to the Philosophy of 
History, “Ethical life, however, is the sense of duty (unquestioned, unconscious), the substantial law—a ‘second 
nature,’ as it has rightly been called (since the ‘first nature’ of human beings is our immediate animal being)” (Hegel 
42). The sense of duty, according to McDowell, is developed through our moral education. Granted McDowell goes 
on to require a degree of questioning once the moral education has created a sense of duty in order for the 
Neurathian reflection to work. 
97 McDowell, “Two Sorts of Naturalism,” 188. 
98 As I argued in the first chapter, even this is open to question. 
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rationality/morality of our actions.99 Second nature is the proper realm of ethical investigation, 
and it is also that which we cannot escape. We cannot get a vantage point outside of our second 
nature, so all evaluation must take place from within second nature, hence Neurath’s boat.  
 I have argued that neither form of naturalized ethics, beginning from either a first or a 
second nature, has been entirely successful in its goal, though both have a great deal to offer in 
their own way. The question that now needs to be asked is whether reason is really so caustic to 
first order nature that nothing from that realm passes into our second nature. Surely not, for while 
we are rational, we are also animals. McDowell seems to forget this at times, yet he does 
acknowledge that second nature cannot be the only story and accepts that first nature matters 
“because the innate endowment of human beings must put limits on the shapings of second 
nature that are possible for them.”100 He also writes that first nature facts can be part of what is 
taken into account by reflection.101 Putting all this together leaves us with a rather confused 
picture of what first nature facts remain after reason has performed its reflection, how those first 
nature facts are supposed to limit what second nature ethical positions are possible, and, finally, 
how reason is supposed to combine first nature and second nature into a meaningful ethics. 
McDowell seems to discount the importance of first nature facts, placing all the emphasis on 
second nature and rational reflection; and yet on the other hand he acknowledges that it is our 
first nature that provides the shape of what type of life we can consider ethical.  
 The question is: Where do we place the emphasis in our ethical investigation? Should we 
look to first nature facts, as Foot does, or to second nature facts, as do Nussbaum and 
                                                             
99 Akin to Nussbaum’s discussion of practical rationality, we also have the moral directive to evaluate our own 
moral beliefs, to “know thyself” so to speak. We can see this moral directive as a rational imperative not to hold 
inconsistent beliefs regarding what one ought to do (which in turn is given through our conceptual scheme of the 
virtues). 
100 McDowell, “Two Sorts of Naturalism,” 190. 
101 McDowell, “Two Sorts of Naturalism,” 190. 
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McDowell? Are we to find our ethical foundations internal to our own beliefs concerning what it 
means to be human or is there an external truth concerning what it means to be human upon 
which our ethics can be grounded? The answer appears to be that neither the internal nor the 
external line of investigation are correct in themselves. What we need is some coherent 
combination of the two that acknowledges the importance of stable, universal facts concerning 
human nature while at the same time allowing for a dynamic, reflective, and plastic process for 
how norms can be built upon these facts.102 We need to be able to account for a vast range of 
possible ethical lives while still being able to define the parameters of possible ethical lives by 
tracing the limits drawn by first nature facts. 
 
2. Hursthouse’s Answer to the Dilemma 
 Hursthouse gives the credit to McDowell for passing through the horns. She writes:  
For either we speak from the neutral point of view, using a scientific account of human 
nature—in which case we won’t get very far—or we speak from within an acquired 
ethical outlook—in which case we will not validate our ethical beliefs, but merely re-
express them.... I shall assume, without argument, that McDowell is right to claim that 
the Neurathian procedure in ethics provides a way between the horns of this dilemma. 
The pretensions of an Aristotelian naturalism are not, in any ordinary understanding of 
the term, either ‘scientific’ or ‘foundational’.... But, for all that, it may serve to provide 
rational credentials for our beliefs about which character traits are the virtues, not merely 
re-express them.103 
 
Hursthouse eschews any sense of a strong foundationalism in virtue ethics, yet she remains 
hopeful that meaningful criteria for ethical beliefs can be maintained via McDowell’s Neurathian 
procedure. However, she takes it a step farther than McDowell, in that she tries to graft Foot’s 
naturalism back onto this Neurathian procedure. She sees the goal of virtue ethics as picking out 
those traits or dispositions that make a person good qua human being. What is good qua human 
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103 Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, 193. 
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being is open for Neurathian debate, but there is hope that a first order naturalism can inform the 
debate in a substantial way.104 She then notes that she has taken over for her own account of 
naturalism much of what is said by Philippa Foot, subsequently entering upon a lengthy 
exposition of Foot’s position.105 The hope, I take it, that Hursthouse has in utilizing Foot’s 
naturalism is, looking back to Neurath’s ship, to inform the crew of the purpose and blueprints of 
what a ship ought to be so that any repairs performed can be successful. Such a goal introduces 
an important distinction between Hursthouse’s Neurathian procedure and McDowell’s, a 
distinction that puts her in a better position to avoid the pitfalls that I have described. She sees 
the necessity of having a universal direction to the Neurathian procedure, and she seeks to justify 
that direction by adopting Foot’s method, at least in part. 
 It may seem strange that Hursthouse sees in Foot’s naturalism a helpful ally. After all, it is 
precisely such an external foundation in ethics that Foot is pushing and that Hursthouse argues is 
a non-starter. But what Hursthouse takes from Foot is the concept of a characteristically human 
way of going about things. After going through an explication of Foot’s point that ‘good’ is an 
attributive adjective whose criteria for meaning can change with use, and following this point up 
with a discussion of how this is illustrated through how we speak of good specimens of plants 
and animals (to which she has no problem giving an external foundation; for, after all, they 
cannot choose to alter their way of life),106 she moves on to question whether this use of ‘good’ 
can be extended to humans.  
 As I mentioned at the end of the second chapter, it is reason that Hursthouse recognizes as 
the characteristically human way of getting along. But her argument against Foot was that our 
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105 Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, 195-211. 
106 The status of the external claims, i.e. whether they are in fact external in the natural kind sense or whether they 
are external in the sense that they exist in our own human conceptualizations of nature, remains unclear. 
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reason calls into question any other characteristically human traits or dispositions. This is the 
negative side of reason’s role in the development of a robust virtue ethics. Hursthouse argues that 
reason can also serve a positive role in fixing a conception of the virtues. She writes: “The very 
substantial effect of claiming our characteristic way of going on is in a rational way, that is ‘in 
any way or ways that we can rightly see we have reason to do’, is that it connects ethical 
evaluations, in our own mouths, with our own view about what there is reason to do.”107 Just as 
Foot confronts the practicality requirement placed on ethics by Hume, Hursthouse makes reason 
the arbiter between our second nature (with ethical claims concerning what dispositions are 
virtuous) and what we believe we have reason to do (in order to live a good human life).108 I 
believe the point she is stressing is that our ethical claims (in the form of what we assert are 
virtues) are normative, and hence action guiding, only if they align with our beliefs concerning 
the good human life. If they fail to align with our beliefs concerning what we have reason to do 
as humans, then they are irrational. The only way to evaluate our ethical claims is by means of 
rationality. In this way normativity finds in rationality a fixed criterion. 
 But this fixed, first nature account of humans as rational doesn’t get us any further than it 
did with Nussbaum’s rational “foundation.” Reason is placed between two contingent conceptual 
schemes both susceptible to revision. We have our second nature virtue scheme that we get 
through moral education on the one side and some pre-theoretic conception of what it means to 
be human and what goes into human flourishing on the other. We fool ourselves into thinking 
that the latter is our first nature when really our first nature is mere rationality (“mere” because it 
can only operate as an empty formalism) that only gets normative power when it evaluates the 
one side in relation to the other. This evaluation can go either way, meaning we can change 
                                                             
107 Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, 232. 
108 Where what is meant by a “good human life” here I take to be a sort of contingent first nature susceptible to 
Neurathian revision in the same way our second nature is. 
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either our virtue concepts or our concept of human flourishing whenever we find that the two 
have some rational conflict between them. Thus the only grounds for moral reprobation on this 
view is if an individual’s ethical evaluations and their beliefs concerning the good human life do 
not align with one another. So long as all of their beliefs do align, we have no way to say that 
they are still getting it wrong. Hursthouse sums the position up by making the point that “[t]o 
recognize a character trait as a virtue, on the grounds of ethical naturalism, is to recognize the X 
reasons for acting people with that character trait characteristically have as reasons, to recognize 
them as reasons for oneself.”109 She does not see this as a problem, but simply as an ethical state 
of affairs to be minimized through moral education. But when asked whether we could ever 
convince a mafioso to adopt our reasons for action she quotes Aristotle’s statement that such a 
man “would not listen to an argument to dissuade him, or understand it if he did.”110  
 What Hursthouse has left us with is a fairly thin conception of ethics. She leaves open the 
possibility that my reasons for action will have absolutely no pull on another if their moral 
education is fundamentally different from mine. In other words, pre-reflectively, we think that 
the mafioso has it wrong, but on Hursthouse’s view the only support for such a claim is precisely 
that we have such a pre-theoretical moral viewpoint. If the lynchpin of an ethics lies only in 
rational coherence, then two equally coherent yet wildly different ethical systems stand on 
equally firm ground. They are like two Neurathian ships passing in the night, each undergoing 
their own internal evaluations. Despite all this I think Hursthouse has the right idea in trying to 
find some common ground between first and second nature such that we can at least define the 
borders of a possible second nature ethics using first nature facts. She simply needs a more  
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robust conception of first order nature to give our rationality something to work with. In the 























Chapter V: Conclusion - Towards an Ethical Realism 
1. A Lived Conception of Humanity 
 The title of this thesis is “The Promise and Limits of Natural Normativity in a Neo-
Aristotelian Virtue Ethics.” Thus far I have focused almost solely on the limits. I have 
investigated two different conceptions of naturalism and the role they may play in devising a 
coherent virtue ethics and have argued that both have limitations that prevent them from being 
wholly successful in this role. My hope, however, is that I have also given some indication of 
what is required if we are to continue within a naturalistic framework in devising a virtue ethics. 
It is still my belief that naturalism provides the most promising direction to tackle the question 
concerning our access to ethical realism. In this final chapter I want to offer a brief sketch of how 
we may get between the horns of the dilemma that Hursthouse mapped out but which, I have 
argued, she has unsuccessfully navigated. 
 Both McDowell and Hursthouse recognize that first nature facts constrain possible 
conceptions of what is a good human life, but they are unclear as to what first nature facts are 
and they look to second nature as doing the important ethical work. Foot seems to be looking for 
first nature facts in her development of natural normativity, but she is never clear as to which 
specific facts she has in mind; or, when she does draw near to particular facts, they seem not to 
be general enough, such that rational doubt concerning their necessity for human life can sneak 
in.111 We need to come to some understanding of what is even meant by first nature facts, an 
understanding that avoids the pitfalls of being scientific facts only properly accessed from some 
Archimedean perspective, but that also maintains a form of stable naturalism.  
 My suggestion hinges on a lived conception of what we mean when we say someone is 
                                                             
111 The argument from here was that in order to get to a degree of generality that doesn’t conflict with the variety of 
lives open to us given our rationality we must dilute natural facts to such a degree that they fail to offer us any real 
direction. 
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human.112 There are certain considerations concerning our understanding of what we mean by 
human that need to be factored into any ethical perspective if it is to be plausibly adopted. These 
are not external scientific facts concerning our species but rather internal limits beyond which the 
term ‘human’ loses any recognizable meaning. Much of this is captured in Aristotle’s own 
definition of a human as a rational and social animal. From such a definition we can derive many 
conclusions concerning what we can and cannot understand as a flourishing or eudaimon human 
life. For instance, a human who consistently fails to implement instrumental reasoning cannot be 
said to be a flourishing human. Beyond this, a human who fails to recognize the rationality 
behind being an honest member of society also cannot be said to be flourishing. This is not (or is 
not only) a failure of one’s instrumental reasoning; it is also a failure that is made possible by a 
misunderstanding of something built into the very concept of a human being, a concept from 
which we necessarily begin. There is a pre-ethical fact concerning the nature of our concept of 
what it means to be human. We, as humans, understand a certain value inherent in truth. If we 
chose a life that rejected such a value in truth it may still be possible to flourish, but it would not 
be human flourishing. In the same way we distinguish non-human animal lives from our own, we 
can distinguish between our concept of “human” and a multitude of alternative moral lives that 
hang together but not in a human way. We include in our concept of a human certain dispositions 
that we have come to value as virtues. This becomes apparent when we say of someone that they 
have lost their humanity. In a way, they have ceased to be human because what they value and 
what we understand as valued by a human subject have come apart. 
 Linking this back to Hursthouse’s statement that our Neurathian boat may become like 
Theseus’s ship, it seems the analogy breaks down. The possibility that Hursthouse allows for in 
this argument requires that we don’t simply swap plank for plank, but that we change the shape 
                                                             
112 What I mean by ‘lived conception’ should become apparent as my argument unfolds. 
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of the ship completely. If what we value, and the virtues that fall out of such values, were to be 
replaced by different values to the point that none of the original values remained, the shape of 
our concept of a flourishing member of the species would no longer share any similarities with 
what we now mean by human flourishing. The moral life of such a being would not be the moral 
life of a human. This lived conception of humanity provides the blueprint for Neurath’s boat. It 
may be argued that this only shows the contingency of any conception of being a human, but my 
response is that this contingency doesn’t apply to our conception of being human.113 That we 
include ethical considerations in our understanding of what it means to be human shows how the 
two (ethics and the concept ‘human’) rely on each other in such a way that to give up the one 
forces us to give up the other. To deny that our ethics plays such a role in our human concept is 
to proceed from some ingrained prejudice that our ethics can be jettisoned while our humanity 
cannot, but this simply is not the case. They stand or fall together. What we need is some middle 
road that takes seriously the way that non-ethical, natural facts already inform our ethics in a 
manner that outlines necessary boundaries for any concept of human flourishing.  Importantly, 
these boundaries can only be discovered from within our own ethical perspective, not from some 
scientific project external to these preconceptions—the perspective I have argued Foot’s position 
entails.   
 
2. A Precedent Found in Nussbaum 
 There is a precedent for the approach I am suggesting. Martha Nussbaum, in “Non-
Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach,” offers certain “facts” of a human life that may 
serve to delineate the parameters of a possible Neurathian project. This paper sits in a strange 
relation to her paper I was discussing earlier in my thesis, “Aristotle on Human Nature and the 
                                                             
113 This “our” is not relative, as will be seen in the discussion of Nussbaum which follows. 
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Foundations of Ethics,” in that she acknowledges in the former that “[Aristotle] was not only the 
defender of an ethical theory based on the virtues, but also the defender of a single objective 
account of the human good, or human flourishing,” further noting that the objectivity of human 
flourishing is justifiable through reasons that cut across traditions and practices.114 This seems at 
odds with her account of ethical evaluations being necessarily internal to our own particular 
ethical outlook as she maintains in “Aristotle on Human Nature;” yet she does allude to how 
these two articles can be brought together when she writes in “Aristotle on Human Nature” that 
Aristotle insists “that the characteristic operations and excellences of practical reasoning, and our 
sociability, are inseparable from the particular ways in which we find ourselves in the world, as 
both capable and limited.”115 She goes on to list (in “Aristotle on Human Nature”), briefly, 
several facts about human existence that perform such limitations upon human capabilities and 
inform our ethical lives. The examples she gives include our mortality, our ability to feel pain 
and pleasure, and that we all have certain appetites and desires. Interestingly, she classifies these 
facts concerning human nature as internal rather than external, but acknowledges that they are a 
“more or less permanent part of the internal perspective of human beings in many times and 
places.”116 These comments are made toward the end of “Aristotle on Human Nature,” and she 
points to her earlier paper as the fully worked out version of these comments. So it is this earlier 
paper, “Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach,” to which I now turn in order to see 
how we may be able to bring these multiple threads of ethical inquiry together into a coherent 
picture. 
                                                             
114 Nussbaum, “Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach” (hereafter “Non-Relative Virtues”) 33. 
115 Nussbaum, “Human Nature,” 120. Exactly in what way they are inseparable is what remains unclear in 
Nussbaum’s account. My suggestion in the above section points to them being taken up in our conception of 
“human” in a similar type of argument as Nussbaum’s self-validating argument. But Nussbaum’s arguments only 
show the rational and social nature of our being, not what fills in the rational and social relation. My suggestion here 
is that she needs to take the argument one step further, something she has so far only done in an incomplete way. 
116 Nussbaum, “Human Nature,” 120. 
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 In this paper Nussbaum argues that Aristotle picks out particular common human 
experiences concerning which choices must be made. Every human being at one point or another 
is confronted with the possibility of bodily harm or death. Every human also experiences 
appetites for certain pleasures, has needs that can be met only by resources that are limited, and 
lives in a world populated by other humans who have similar experiences. Because these 
experiences are common to all humans and all require a choice of some sort, we can ask what it 
means to choose well in each case. The application of such words as “courage” when confronted 
with an experience threatening bodily harm or death, “moderation” in regard to our appetite for 
pleasures, “justice” in meeting one’s personal needs when confronted with limited resources, 
give us a ‘thin account’ of the virtues that can be filled in by investigating particular instances 
and extrapolating from them a ‘thick’ understanding of what we mean. Nussbaum writes: “The 
job of ethical theory will be to search for the best further specification corresponding to this 
nominal definition, and to produce a full definition.”117 
 Nussbaum goes on to give her own list of such experiences or features common to 
humanity. She includes on her list mortality, the body, pleasure and pain, cognitive capability, 
practical reason, early infant development, affiliation (a sense of human fellowship), and humor. 
These are, according to Nussbaum, all experiences or features that any human life will need to 
include if it is to be a fully human life, and ethical inquiry seeks to find the best way of 
accommodating for these necessities. After providing this list she sums up what she believes we 
can achieve from this line of inquiry. She writes: “We do not have a bedrock of completely 
uninterpreted ‘given’ data, but we do have a nuclei of experience around which the constructions 
of different societies proceed. There is no Archimedean point here, and no pure access to  
 
                                                             
117 Nussbaum, “Non-Relative Virtues,” 35-35. 
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unsullied ‘nature’—even, here, human nature—as it is in and of itself. There is just human life as 
it is lived.”118 
 
3. Conclusion 
 While the notion of naturalism we are left with in the project I have described may seem 
far removed from what many consider to be nature (understood as what is gotten at through 
science), in many ways I see it as a more consistent notion. We understand what it means to be 
human not through some pseudo-objective investigation,119 but through actual lived experience. 
Granted this leaves any account open a great deal of interpretation; but I believe that so long as it 
is done in accordance with a rational, Neurathian style of reflection we have reason to believe 
that the ethics that result will not be relative in any pejorative sense.120  We have then, in my 
“lived conception of humanity” and Nussbaum’s universally lived experiences, a bridge between 
first and second nature. The promise then is that by means of this bridge we can develop a 
meaningful form of ethical realism that takes from both sides of the naturalism debate, and in so 







118 Nussbaum, “Non-Relative Virtues,” 49. 
119 “Pseudo-objective” because it is my contention that any investigation into the content of the concept of ‘human’ 
necessarily carries with it the baggage of preconceptions that keep it from ever achieving objectivity in the sense 
that is taken for granted as the scientific goal. 
120 I make this qualification because the particulars of any ethical explanation will be different, but this is accounted 
for via a naturalistic description of differing environmental considerations humans need to confront. This allows for 
a great deal of variance in ways that an ethical life may appear on the surface while still cutting off the possibility of 
irresolvable ethical conflict. 
55 
REFERENCES 
Anscombe, G.E.M., “Modern Moral Philosophy.” In Virtue Ethics, edited by Roger Crisp and 
Michael Slote, 26-44. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. 
 
Anscombe, G.E.M., “On Promising and its Justice.” in Ethics, Religion and Politics (The 
Collected Philosophical Papers of G. E. M. Anscombe, Volume 3), Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1981. 
 
Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by W.D. Ross. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1995. 
 
Burnyeat, M.F., “Aristotle on Learning to be Good” in Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, edited by A. 
Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980) pp. 69-92. 
 
Foot, Philippa. Natural Goodness. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. 
 
Harman, Gilbert. “Moral Relativism Defended.” Philosophical Review 84 (1975): 3-22. 
 
Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. 
 
Hursthouse, Rosalind. On Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
 
Irwin, T.H., “The Metaphysical and Psychological Basis of Aristotle Ethics” in Essays on 
Aristotle’s Ethics, A. Rorty (ed.) (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 35-
54. 
 
McDowell, John, “Eudaimonism and Realism in Aristotle’s Ethics” in Aristotle and Moral 
Realism R. Heinaman (ed.) (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995). 
 
McDowell, John, “Some Issues in Aristotle’s Moral Psychology” in Mind, Value, and Reality 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998) pp. 23-49. 
 
McDowell, John, “The Role of Eudaimonia in Aristotle’s Ethics” in Mind, Value, and Reality 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998) pp.3-22. 
 
McDowell, John, “Two Sorts of Naturalism” in Mind, Value, and Reality (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1998) pp. 167-197. 
 
Nussbaum, Martha, “Aristotle on Human Nature and the Foundations of Ethics” in Mind, World, 
and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams, Altham and Harrison 
(eds.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) pp. 86-131. 
 
Nussbaum, Martha, “Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach,” Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy, XIII (1988): 32-53. 
 
56 
Plato, “Philebus,” in Plato Complete Works, John M. Cooper (ed.) (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1997) pp. 398-456. 
 
Williams, Bernard. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1985. 
 
 
 
